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SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST GUN SUICIDE 
FREDRICK E. VARS* 
Abstract: Around twenty-thousand Americans each year commit suicide using 
a gun. Many would survive if it were more difficult to obtain the gun. The pro-
posal here is not for gun control, but self control. Specifically, this article pro-
poses allowing individuals to confidentially put their names into the existing 
federal background check system to prevent or delay their own future firearm 
purchases. Empowering people to restrict their own access to guns has the po-
tential to save many lives, is supported by other self-binding regimes, and poses 
no serious constitutional concerns. 
It is always thus, impelled by a state of mind which is destined not to last, 
that we make our irrevocable decisions. 
—Marcel Proust1 
INTRODUCTION 
Suicide is a largely ignored public health crisis. Mass shootings usually 
dominate the news, but firearm suicide is a much larger killer. In recent years, 
an average of one hundred and thirty-three people have died annually in mass 
shootings in the United States.2 Around twenty-thousand people each year 
commit suicide with a firearm.3 
This article proposes empowering people to erect for themselves a barri-
er against suicide. Specifically, an individual could voluntarily add his or her 
own name to the list of those already prohibited from purchasing a firearm in 
the current federal background check system. The individual could then have 
his or her name removed after a seven-day waiting period. 
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 1 WITHIN A BUDDING GROVE, PART ONE 215 (C.K. Scott Moncrieff trans., 1951). 
 2 Kevin A. Kepple et al., Mass Shootings Toll Exceeds 900 in Past Seven Years, USA TODAY 
(Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/21/mass-shootings-domestic-
violence-nra/1937041/l [http://perma.cc/JA9H-SG5J]. 
 3 DONNA L. HOYERT & JIAQUAN XU, NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS, DEATHS: PRELIM-
INARY DATA FOR 2011, at 19 (2012). 
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There are good reasons to think that this modest proposal could signifi-
cantly reduce suicide. Most suicides are impulsive. The time period between 
a decision to commit suicide and an attempt is usually less than a day.4 The 
overwhelming majority of people who survive a suicide attempt die at a later 
date from a cause other than suicide, suggesting that suicidal impulses usually 
dissipate with time.5 Firearms have a much higher fatality rate than nearly 
every other suicide method.6 Waiting periods, however, have been shown to 
reduce suicide for some groups of people.7 The present proposal seeks to pre-
vent suicide by allowing people essentially to opt for a waiting period to pur-
chase a firearm.  
An actual case illustrates the utility of this proposal. Jonathan Jacoves 
was described by his father as a “happy-go-lucky, pro tennis player.”8 That 
was before Jonathan’s mental health deteriorated. At age twenty, he attempted 
suicide by overdosing on nonprescription medication and was diagnosed with 
“major depressive disorder, recurrent in a schizoid paranoid personality with 
suicidal potential and ideation.”9 Before being discharged from the hospital, 
Jonathan entered into a contract with his parents through which he agreed not 
to commit suicide for four months.10 Jonathan told a psychiatric aide about 
the agreement and that “he hoped he meant it, but doubted it.”11 Eleven days 
after his release from the hospital, Jonathan purchased a rifle from a sporting 
goods store and, the same day, used it to commit suicide.12 
The present proposal could well have saved Jonathan’s life. His elevated 
risk of suicide was apparent to everyone, including himself. Jonathan did not 
want to commit suicide, and even pledged not to, but he did not trust his own 
willpower. Had Jonathan been able to put his name into the federal back-
ground check database upon his discharge from the hospital, he would not 
have been able to purchase the deadly rifle less than two weeks later. He 
could have used an alternative method to commit suicide, to be sure, but 
                                                                                                                                          
 4 Linda G. Peterson et al., Self-Inflicted Gunshot Wounds: Lethality of Method Versus Intent, 
142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 228, 228–31 (1985). 
 5 Matthew Miller & David Hemenway, Guns and Suicide in the United States, 359 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 989, 989 (2008). 
 6 Matthew Miller et al., Suicide Mortality in the United States: The Importance of Attending 
to Method in Understanding Population-Level Disparities in the Burden of Suicide, 33 ANN. REV. 
PUB. HEALTH 393, 397 tbl.1 (2012) [hereinafter Miller et al., Suicide Mortality]. 
 7 Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook, Homicide and Suicide Rates Associated with Implementation 
of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 284 JAMA 585, 585 (2000) (reporting a decrease 
in gun suicides for victims aged fifty-five years or older after the enactment of the Brady Handgun 
Violence Prevention Act). 
 8 RITA ROBINSON, SURVIVORS OF SUICIDE 55 (1989). 
 9 Jacoves v. United Merch. Corp., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 472–73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
 10 Id. at 474. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
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probably not one as lethal as a firearm. Under the proposed approach, Jona-
than would have had to submit new paperwork and wait an additional seven 
days before he could purchase a firearm. One cannot know whether Jona-
than’s resolve to commit suicide would have faded in that time, but, as noted 
above, most suicide attempts are impulsive, not deliberative. 
Jonathan made a commitment to his parents, which he then broke. This 
article’s proposal would allow for something stronger: an enforceable “pre-
commitment” not to buy a gun in the future, which this article refers to as 
Precommitment Against Suicide or “PAS.” One scholar, Jon Elster, has aptly 
described the general structure of precommitment thusly:  
At time 1 an individual wants to do A at time 2, but anticipates that 
when time 2 arrives he [or she] may or will do B unless prevented 
from doing so. In such cases, rational behavior at time 1 may in-
volve precautionary measures to prevent the choice of B at time 2, 
or at least to make that choice less likely.13  
The classic example is Ulysses ordering his men to tie him to the mast so that 
he would not succumb to the otherwise irresistible Sirens’ song.14 Guarding 
against a foreseeable impulse or defect in reason is a compelling justification 
for precommitment and one that applied to both Ulysses and Jonathan.  
Precommitment has been a successful deterrent in two analogous con-
texts: (1) psychiatric advance directives and (2) self-exclusion from gam-
bling. In the former, a potential patient gives instructions regarding medical 
care during an anticipated period of incapacity. In the latter, a person puts him 
or herself on a list of people prohibited from gambling. In both contexts some 
commentators worry that the precommitment itself may reflect passion, not 
reason. The same concern applies to PAS, but there are two fundamental dif-
ferences that outweigh it. First, suicide is irreversible; the other results are 
not. Second, a seven-day waiting period to undo the PAS is a relatively small 
obstacle that helps to ensure deliberation.15 
Importantly, PAS is constitutional.16 Even assuming, arguendo, that PAS 
infringes upon the right to bear arms or the right to die, it still passes strict 
scrutiny. Allowing individuals who fear suicide to delay their own gun pur-
                                                                                                                                          
 13  JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND 
CONSTRAINTS 5 (2000) [hereinafter ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND]. 
 14 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, Book XII (Samuel Butler trans., 2013), available at http://classics.
mit.edu/Homer/odyssey.12.xii.html [http://perma.cc/MRG3-QCXH]; see Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1113 (1972) (describing Ulysses’s order as “self paternalism”). 
 15 See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the 
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1238–40 (2003) (explaining the 
so-called “cooling off” period). 
 16 See infra notes 158–232 and accompanying text. 
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chases is narrowly tailored to the compelling government interest in prevent-
ing suicide. The do-not-call list—which allows individuals to opt-out of re-
ceiving telemarketing calls—is a close analog. There, courts applying strict 
scrutiny have upheld the list because it is narrowly tailored to the compelling 
government interest in protecting privacy.17 Like the do-not-call list, PAS is 
limited to volunteers, which ensures that it is no broader than necessary. 
This article proceeds in five sections. Part I situates and outlines the PAS 
proposal.18 Drawing on research about suicide, Part II argues that PAS would 
likely save many lives at relatively little cost.19 Part III then explains the theo-
ry of precommitment and argues that firearm purchase is an almost ideal situ-
ation for it.20 That conclusion is then supported by analogy to two comparable 
precommitment regimes. Finally, Part IV establishes that PAS is constitution-
al21 and Part V discusses counter-arguments from the left and right.22 A brief 
conclusion follows. 
I. THE PAS PROPOSAL 
PAS is a modest proposal. It can be characterized as an opt-in waiting 
period for firearms purchases. There is no federal waiting period to purchase 
firearms, though eleven states have them.23 A few additional states have li-
cense or permit requirements that include some delay, at least for first firearm 
purchases.24 
Purchase delays under federal law are also possible but rare. All pur-
chases from Federal Firearms Licensees, which include, in effect, all com-
mercial sellers, require a background check through the National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”).25 Certain categories of indi-
viduals (e.g., convicted felons) are thereby prevented from purchasing fire-
                                                                                                                                          
 17 Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 358 F.3d 1228, 1242 (10th Cir. 
2004). 
 18 See infra notes 23–33 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 34–102 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 103–157 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 158–232 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 233–238 and accompanying text. 
 23 Brian Burns, Note, Holding Fire: Why Long Waiting Periods to Buy a Gun Violate the 
Second Amendment, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 379, 399–400 (2013). Six states have waiting periods 
for all firearms, four states have waiting periods for handguns only, and one state has a waiting 
period solely for long guns. Id. Of the six states with waiting periods for all firearms, two states 
have periods longer than seven days and three have seven-day waiting periods. Id. at 399. Illinois 
has two waiting periods: a seventy-two hour waiting period for handguns and a twenty-four hour 
waiting period for long guns. Id.  
 24 See id. at 400 n.165 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-2(e) (2008)).  
 25 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK 
SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/reports/2012-operations-
report [http://perma.cc/DQP4-HT4K] [hereinafter NICS OPERATIONS]. 
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arms.26 If NICS cannot clear a person within three days, the transaction can 
go forward without a completed check.27 Over ninety percent of NICS deter-
minations are made while the dealer is still on the phone.28 
Against this backdrop, PAS would work in the following way. A simple 
form asking to be put on the “No-Guns List” would be made widely available 
at gun shops, health care provider locations, and on the internet.29 An individ-
ual could sign the form, have it notarized, and send it to the administrator of 
the federal background check system, who would enter the individual’s name 
into the system.30 As soon as the form is received and processed, the individ-
ual would be prohibited from purchasing a firearm from a licensed dealer.31 
The process would be the same to be removed from the list, except that re-
moval would take place seven days after receipt of the notarized form. 
Whether a person was prohibited from purchasing a gun would remain confi-
dential to everyone but a dealer undertaking a required background check, 
and not even such a dealer would know why an individual was in the sys-
tem.32 Outside of background checks, these records may only be accessed by 
governmental agencies in connection with the issuance of a firearm or explo-
sives-related permit or license, and by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire-
arms and Explosives (“ATF”) in connection with law enforcement activity 
related to a firearm offense.33 
                                                                                                                                          
 26 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). 
 27 NICS OPERATIONS, supra note 25. 
 28 Id. 
 29 A government mandate may or may not be needed. See Associated Press, N.H. Suicide Pre-
vent [sic] Project Focuses on Gun Shops, USA TODAY (Apr. 20, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2013/04/20/nh-suicide-prevention-guns/2099175/ [http://perma.cc/7UEC-YX88] 
(reporting that half of contacted gun shops were voluntarily using suicide prevention materials). 
 30 It may be possible to design the program to allow for completely online transactions. See 
NotaryCam: Sign It for Sure, https://www.notarycam.com/ [http://perma.cc/67MG-KB93] (offer-
ing webcam notarization valid in all states for twenty-five dollars per notarization). 
 31 PAS would restrict purchase, not possession. The goal is prevention, not punishment. This 
differs from current federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (prohibiting possession of a firearm by 
certain classes of people); see also David E. Patton, Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisi-
tion, 122 YALE L.J. 2578, 2595–97 (2013) (describing federal prosecution for illegal gun posses-
sion, not purchase, by a mentally ill man who had used a gun in a failed suicide attempt). 
 32 See 28 C.F.R. § 25.6(C)(2) (2015) (explaining precautions in place to maintain confidenti-
ality). 
 33 Id. § 25.6(j). Not even a criminal defendant would have a constitutional right of access to 
PAS information, because confidentiality is not “disproportionate” to the goal of encouraging PAS 
participation. Cf. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006) (explaining that evidentiary 
rules disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote are not constitutional). Alt-
hough this article proposes a federal program, state level versions are also possible. Some states 
already perform their own background checks, which could be expanded at relatively low cost. 
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II. RATIONALE SUPPORTING PAS 
PAS is a new method of reducing access to firearms and empowering 
people at risk for suicide to protect themselves. There are at least three ways 
PAS might reduce suicide. The first and most direct pathway is by preventing 
the purchase of a firearm for quick use in a suicide attempt, as with Jonathan 
Jacoves.34 As described below, research shows that waiting periods reduce 
gun prevalence, and that lower gun prevalence reduces suicides.35 This will 
reduce the chances that there will be a gun in the home should suicidal 
thoughts arise in the future. 
Second, introducing and advertising PAS may reduce gun access even 
among people who do not participate. Suicide prevention efforts already ad-
vise putting firearms out of reach of people at high risk.36 Launching a new 
federal program to reduce suicide by voluntarily curbing access to firearms 
will help disseminate well-established findings showing the benefits of get-
ting existing firearms out of the house.37 Some people and their families may 
decide to remove or lock up firearms even if they do not opt for PAS.  
Third, providing a relatively easy avenue for people concerned about su-
icide to reduce their own risk of self harm may help alleviate the despair and 
anxiety that pushes them toward suicide in the first place. PAS would be a 
new method of restricting access to lethal means, which is already a compo-
nent of certain safety protocols employed by the U.S. Department of Veterans 
Affairs with high-risk veterans.38 Like other aspects of safety planning fo-
                                                                                                                                          
 34 See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text. 
 35 Gary Kleck & E. Britt Patterson, The Impact of Gun Control and Gun Ownership Levels on 
Violence Rates, 9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 249, 271 (1993). It should be noted that an 
individual who has volunteered for PAS may be less likely to purchase a firearm at all, even dur-
ing non-suicidal periods. 
 36 See Suicide Prevention, HEALTH NET FED. SERVS., https://www.hnfs.com/content/dam/
hnfs/tn/common/pdf/wellness_newsletter/PF0614x033%20suicide%20prevent.pdf [http://perma.
cc/NLV8-EYYL] (“If you sense an individual is in immediate danger . . . [r]emove any firearms, 
drugs or sharp objects that could be used in a suicide attempt.”); Suicide Risk Factors, NAT’L 
SUICIDE PREVENTION LIFELINE, http://www.suicidepreventionlifeline.org/learn/riskfactors.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/4TH8-VJRN] (listing as risk factor “[e]asy access to lethal means”). Massachu-
setts passed a bill to prevent suicide by reducing access to lethal means. See H.B. 4278, 188th Gen. 
Court (Mass. 2014), available at https://malegislature.gov/Bills/188/House/H4278 [http://perma.cc/
9H9C-JWGF]. 
 37 E. Michael Lewiecki & Sara A. Miller, Suicide, Guns and Policy, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
27, 28 (2013) (“[T]here is now a large body of evidence suggesting that [firearm access] re-
striction not only reduces suicides by that method but also reduces overall suicide rates.”); Miller 
& Hemenway, supra note 5, at 990 (reporting an almost double overall suicide rate in high gun 
ownership states as compared with low gun ownership states). 
 38 U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, SAFETY PLAN QUICK GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS (2012), 
http://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/docs/VASafetyPlanColor.pdf [http://perma.cc/CVC4-JAVN] (ex-
plaining safety planning, which involves a series of concrete steps taken to reduce suicide risk and 
remains the standard of care for patients at high risk of suicide). 
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cused on self-help, PAS would “enhance patients’ self-efficacy and can help 
to create a sense that suicidal urges can be mastered,” which in turn “may 
help [patients] feel less vulnerable and less at the mercy of their suicidal 
thoughts.”39 In short, allowing people to protect themselves in this way may 
give them back a sense of control over their lives. Relatedly, hopelessness is a 
significant risk factor for suicide.40 Providing an opportunity for distressed 
individuals to take one concrete step to prevent suicide may itself mitigate 
feelings of hopelessness.41 This could reduce non-firearm suicides as well. 
There is compelling evidence to support the argument that PAS will re-
duce suicides through these pathways. The remainder of this part summarizes 
that evidence in four sections. Section A establishes that most suicides are 
impulsive. This means that even a one-week delay can deter many suicide 
attempts. Section B next shows how restricting access to firearms can reduce 
suicide. Section C then examines waiting periods. Finally, section D argues 
that a significant number of people would in fact elect to participate in PAS. 
A. Impulsivity of Suicide 
Many suicides are impulsive—estimates range from one-third to four-
fifths.42 One commentator concluded that for most people, the period of real 
risk for suicide is “relatively brief,” lasting minutes, hours, or days, “but rare-
ly longer.”43 One study of suicide attempt survivors (various means) found 
that for nearly all, the period between the decision to attempt suicide and the 
attempt was less than one week.44 The most directly applicable data come 
                                                                                                                                          
 39 Barbara Stanley & Gregory K. Brown, Safety Planning Intervention: A Brief Intervention 
to Mitigate Suicide Risk, 19 COGNITIVE & BEHAV. PRAC. 256, 259 (2012). 
 40 Dean McMillan et al., Can We Predict Suicide and Non-Fatal Self-Harm with the Beck 
Hopelessness Scale? A Meta-Analysis, 37 PSYCHOL. MED. 769, 777 (2007) (“This systematic 
review confirms that hopelessness . . . is a risk factor for suicide . . . .”); see also Aaron T. Beck et 
al., Relationship Between Hopelessness and Ultimate Suicide: A Replication with Psychiatric 
Outpatients, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 190, 190 (1990) (arguing that hopelessness leads to suicide 
because patients view their problems as unsolvable). 
 41 See Beck, supra note 40, at 194 (reporting that clinical interventions can mitigate hopeless-
ness). 
 42 See Miller & Hemenway, supra note 5, at 989. 
 43 Keith Hawton, Restricting Access to Methods of Suicide: Rationale and Evaluation of This 
Approach to Suicide Prevention, 28 CRISIS: J. CRISIS INTERVENTION & SUICIDE PREVENTION 
(Supp. 1) 4, 5 (2007). 
 44 Eberhard A. Deisenhammer et al., The Duration of the Suicidal Process: How Much Time 
Is Left for Intervention Between Consideration and Accomplishment of a Suicide Attempt?, 70 J. 
CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 19, 21 (2009). For roughly 75%, the period was ten minutes or less, which is 
obviously insufficient time to purchase a firearm. Id.; accord Thomas R. Simon et al., Character-
istics of Impulsive Suicide Attempts and Attempters, 32 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 
49, 52 (2001). 
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from a study of thirty survivors of firearm suicide attempts, which found that 
more than half had suicidal thoughts for less than a day.45 
The suicidal impulse is very often fleeting and non-recurring. More than 
ninety percent of suicide attempt survivors go on to die from something other 
than suicide.46 In other words, they do not attempt suicide again and again 
until they are successful. The short deliberation period and post-attempt deci-
sion to live make sense given what we know about the motivations for sui-
cide. 
Although certain categories of people are at an elevated baseline risk 
level, suicide is very typically motivated by transitory causes. One review of 
seventy-six studies found that the median proportion of suicides involving a 
mental disorder was around ninety percent.47 One meta-analysis concluded 
that “virtually all mental disorders have an increased risk of suicide.”48 The 
high suicide risk phases of most disorders are temporary,49 and there are ef-
fective pharmacological and psychological interventions. 50  Mental illness 
may not be curable, but people do generally get better with time and treat-
ment.51 
Firearm suicide in particular is often driven by life crises within the past 
week, relationship problems, and alcohol use.52 “The choice of a firearm as a 
                                                                                                                                          
 45 Peterson et al., supra note 4, at 5; see also Miller et al., Suicide Mortality, supra note 6, at 
402 (describing a study in which 70% of survivors of near-lethal suicide attempts deliberated for 
less than one hour); Megan Spokas et al., Characteristics of Individuals Who Make Impulsive 
Suicide Attempts, 136 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 1121, 1123 (2012) (finding that only 36.1% of 
people contemplated suicide for three or more hours before an attempt). 
 46 Miller & Hemenway, supra note 5, at 989. 
 47 José Manoel Bertolote et al., Psychiatric Diagnoses and Suicide: Revisiting the Evidence, 
25 CRISIS: J. CRISIS INTERVENTION & SUICIDE PREVENTION 147, 149 tbl.2 (2004) (reporting in a 
narrower review an even higher percentage with mental illness); Jonathan T.O. Cavanagh et al., 
Psychological Autopsy Studies of Suicide: A Systematic Review, 33 PSYCHOL. MED. 395, 399 
(2003). The primary diagnosis in the largest number of these cases was depression, though also 
common were other mood disorders, substance-abuse disorders, schizophrenia, and personality 
disorders. See Bertolote et al., supra, at 149; Cavanagh et al., supra, at 399. 
 48 E. Clare Harris & Brian Barraclough, Suicide as an Outcome for Mental Illness: A Meta-
Analysis, 170 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 205, 222 (1997). 
 49 Mark Olfson et al., Focusing Suicide Prevention on Periods of High Risk, 311 JAMA 1107, 
1107 (2014). 
 50 Cavanagh et al., supra note 47, at 401–02 (“[B]etween a half and three quarters of suicides 
could be avoided were it possible to have completely effective treatment, or prevention, of mental 
disorders.”). 
 51 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON 
GENERAL 64–65 (1999), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBHS.pdf [http://
perma.cc/D57H-SUUZ]. 
 52 Mark S. Kaplan et al., Characteristics of Adult Male and Female Firearm Suicide Dece-
dents: Findings from the National Violent Death Reporting System, 15 INJ. PREVENTION 322, 325 
(2009); see also Charles C. Branas et al., Acute Alcohol Consumption, Alcohol Outlets, and Gun 
Suicide, 46 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 1592, 1598 (2011) (“Our findings suggest a strong con-
nection between acute alcohol consumption and intentionally self-inflicted gun injury and gun 
2015] Self-Defense Against Gun Suicide 1473 
suicide method appears to be precipitated by stressful life events.”53 Because 
such causes are less constant than mental illness, firearm suicide “appears far 
more unpredictable and impulsive” than suicide by other means.54 But im-
portantly, these causes can be addressed with time. The effects of alcohol are 
generally temporary, and strategies such as telephone crisis lines have been 
effective in reducing suicide.55 The likelihood of committing suicide decreas-
es as the temporal distance from the trigger event increases. 
B. Restricting Firearm Access56 
Surviving the suicidal moment usually avoids suicide altogether.57 The 
chance of survival goes up dramatically if there is no readily available fire-
arm. Firearm suicide attempts succeed in 85% of cases, as compared with an 
overall fatality rate for all methods of only 9%.58 The evidence is overwhelm-
ing that a firearm at home increases suicide risk.59 
 This association is not just the product of individuals without firearms 
using less deadly methods. In fact, restricting access to firearms appears to 
deter many suicide attempts altogether.60 One real-world example bears a 
close resemblance to PAS: reducing Israel Defense Forces soldiers’ access to 
firearms on weekends led to a forty percent reduction in suicide.61 Weekend 
                                                                                                                                          
suicide.”); Hawton, supra note 43, at 5 (“The most frequent reason given by the [survivor of self-
inflicted firearm injury] was interpersonal conflict with a partner or family member.”); Peterson et 
al., supra note 4, at 4–5 (“Fifteen of the [thirty self-inflicted gunshot] patients had used drugs or 
alcohol within twenty-four hours before the wounding, and eighteen patients had experienced an 
interpersonal conflict during that period.”). 
 53 Kaplan et al., supra note 52, at 325. 
 54 Id. at 326. 
 55 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN. & NAT’L 
ACTION ALLIANCE FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION, 2012 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR SUICIDE PREVEN-
TION: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR ACTION 21 (2012), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
reports/national-strategy-suicide-prevention/full_report-rev.pdf [http://perma.cc/YWQ2-6B8D] [here-
inafter NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION]. 
 56 “Means restriction” is the umbrella term used to describe any restriction on access to means 
of committing suicide. PAS, by limiting access to firearms, obviously qualifies as “means re-
striction.” For an engaging introduction to “means restriction,” see generally Scott Anderson, The 
Urge to End It All, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 6, 2008, at 38–43, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/07/06/magazine/06suicide-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/P8CL-ABGZ]. 
 57 Miller & Hemenway, supra note 5, at 989. 
 58 Miller et al., Suicide Mortality, supra note 6, at 397 tbl.1. 
 59 Id. at 401; see Matthew Miller et al., Firearms and Suicide in the United States: Is Risk 
Independent of Underlying Suicidal Behavior?, 178 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 946, 948 (2013). 
 60 Miller et al., Suicide Mortality, supra note 6, at 399–400. 
 61 Id. at 402. For a similar example with a similar reduction in suicide, see Thomas Reisch et 
al., Change in Suicide Rates in Switzerland Before and After Firearm Restriction Resulting from 
the 2003 “Army XXI” Reform, 170 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 977, 981 (2013). More broadly, one litera-
ture review concluded that “the risk of substitution or displacement towards other methods seems 
small.” Marc S. Daigle, Suicide Prevention Through Means Restriction: Assessing the Risk of 
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firearm suicides declined with no significant uptick in weekday or non-
firearm suicides. In that case, what essentially amounted to a two-day waiting 
period for firearm access substantially reduced suicide; it did not merely de-
lay firearm suicide or shift individuals to other means. 
The evidence overwhelmingly shows that keeping firearms altogether 
out of reach of individuals at high risk of suicide saves lives.62 But would a 
restriction limited to immediate purchase have a significant effect? Very like-
ly yes. The National Research Council (“NRC”), citing two studies, has stated 
that “a small but significant fraction of gun suicides are committed within 
days to weeks after the purchase of a handgun.”63 
The first of those studies concluded that “[s]ome persons may purposely 
buy a handgun to commit suicide.”64 The basis for this conclusion was the 
finding that suicide risk was highest during the first year after handgun pur-
chase.65 The second study found that the rate of firearm suicide in the first 
week after the purchase of a handgun was fifty-seven times as high as the rate 
in the general population.66 More closely on point, a study of firearm suicides 
in Wisconsin found a sharp increase in risk of suicide within one week of gun 
purchase.67 At the time of the study, Wisconsin’s waiting period for handguns 
was just forty-eight hours.68 
The NRC report and these three studies are consistent with two addi-
tional studies. A recent review of state medical examiner records in New 
Hampshire, which had no waiting period for gun purchases, revealed that dur-
ing a two-year period “nearly one in ten [firearm suicides] were committed 
with a gun that was purchased or rented within a week of the suicide (usually 
within hours).” 69 An older, two-site Tennessee-Washington study found a 
                                                                                                                                          
Substitution: A Critical Review and Synthesis, 37 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 625, 630 
(2005). 
 62 Miller et al., Suicide Mortality, supra note 6, at 399–400. 
 63 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 181 (Charles 
F. Wellford et al. eds., 2004). 
 64 Peter Cummings et al., The Association Between the Purchase of a Handgun and Homicide 
or Suicide, 87 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 974, 977 (1997). 
 65 Id. at 976. It must be conceded that the shortest period between purchase and handgun 
suicide in that study was eleven days, which is of course longer than the seven-day waiting period 
proposed here. 
 66 Garen J. Wintemute et al., Mortality Among Recent Purchasers of Handguns, 341 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1583, 1585 (1999). It should be noted, however, that the study used data from Cali-
fornia, which, at the time, had a ten-day waiting period for handgun purchase. 
 67 Stephen W. Hargarten et al., Suicide Guns: Why Collect This Information?, 6 INJ. PREVEN-
TION 245, 245 (2000). 
 68 See WIS. STAT. § 175.35(2)(d) (1998). 
 69  Suicide Prevention: A Role for Firearm Dealers and Ranges, CONNECT, http://www.
theconnectprogram.org/firearms-safety-coalitions-role-nh-suicide-prevention [http://perma.cc/6BFP-
Q9RU] [hereinafter Suicide Prevention]. Two-thirds of the reports failed to disclose when the gun 
was obtained, which suggests that the figure could be an underestimate. Id. 
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lower figure: three percent of suicide victims used a firearm obtained within 
two weeks.70 This study is also significant because it showed that six percent 
of suicides by people who lived in homes without guns were nonetheless 
committed with a firearm.71 Signing up for PAS would make it more difficult 
for such people to obtain firearms. 
There were 19,766 firearm suicides nationwide in 2011.72 The New 
Hampshire and Tennessee-Washington studies suggest that between 600 (3%) 
and 2000 (10%) of them may have been committed with guns obtained short-
ly before the suicide.73 Clearly, the potential direct effect of PAS is substan-
tial. 
C. Waiting Periods for Firearm Purchase 
PAS, like a waiting period, delays gun purchase. It is therefore logical in 
evaluating the potential effectiveness of PAS to look to studies assessing 
waiting periods that require all purchasers to wait some number of days be-
fore taking possession of the gun. Although evidence from other countries 
supports the view that waiting periods can reduce suicide,74 there are surpris-
ingly few domestic studies and their conclusions are mixed. 
The first major American study found that waiting periods reduced gun 
prevalence in 1979 and 1980 but had no significant effect on total suicide.75 
This is puzzling given that the study also concluded that “gun prevalence 
rates may increase total suicide rates.”76 If waiting periods reduce gun preva-
lence and lower gun prevalence reduces suicide, then why would waiting pe-
riods not reduce suicide? They probably do, and the study’s failure to find 
statistical significance may be the product of specification: including the 
waiting period and gun prevalence variables in the same regression predicting 
suicide.77 Doing so may have led to an underestimation of the overall effect 
                                                                                                                                          
 70 Arthur Kellerman et al., Suicide in the Home in Relation to Gun Ownership, 327 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 467, 470 (1992). 
 71 Id. 
 72 HOYERT & XU, supra note 3, at 19 tbl.2. This number rose slightly between 2011 and 2013. 
See Fatal Injury Reports, National and Regional, 1999–2013, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PRE-
VENTION, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_us.html [http://perma.cc/266C-RTBT] 
(reporting 21,175 firearm suicides in 2013). 
 73 See Kellerman et al., supra note 70; Suicide Prevention, supra note 69. 
 74 See Joan Ozanne-Smith et al., Firearm Related Deaths: The Impact of Regulatory Reform, 
10 INJ. PREVENTION 280, 283–85 (2004); Christopher H. Cantor & Penelope J. Slater, The Impact 
of Firearm Control Legislation on Suicide in Queensland: Preliminary Findings, 162 MED. J. 
AUSTL. 583, 584–85 (1995); ELISABETH SCARFF, EVALUATION OF THE CANADIAN GUN CON-
TROL LEGISLATION 5, 29 (1983). See also Wintemute et al., supra note 66, at 1588 (summarizing 
international findings). 
 75 Kleck & Patterson, supra note 35, at 271 tbl.III(E). 
 76 Id. at 272. 
 77 See id. at 271. 
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of waiting periods on suicide by shifting some of that effect to the gun preva-
lence variable. In other words, the researchers stacked the deck against wait-
ing periods. A second very important limitation of the study was its unit of 
analysis: mid- to large-sized cities. Some cities appeared to have waiting pe-
riods whereas their states did not.78 Such restrictions are easily avoided by 
simply driving outside the city limits.79 That the study found no significant 
effect on suicide may have reflected the fact that, in some places, the effective 
waiting period was merely a short drive. 
A second major American study similarly found no significant overall 
effect of gun purchase waiting periods on suicide, but did find a significant 
reduction in firearm suicide among people aged fifty-five years and older.80 
That is an important and encouraging result, especially in light of a limitation 
of this study: the unit of observation was the state.81 Thus, if the Brady Hand-
gun Violence Protection Act mandated a change in the statewide waiting pe-
riod, the whole state was lumped together as changing even though cities or 
counties may have already had similar or even longer waiting periods and 
experienced no relevant changes. Waiting periods appear promising, but more 
research is needed.82 
These two U.S. waiting period studies, particularly when combined with 
the foreign studies cited above, provide some support for PAS. In addition, 
there is an important reason to think PAS will actually be more effective in 
reducing suicide than an actual waiting period. For the purposes of this arti-
cle, “actual waiting period” means only a mandatory delay, rather than put-
ting one’s name in NICS with a delayed revocation option. PAS, the latter, is 
the default more likely to stick. Having added one’s name to NICS, people 
will be less likely to make the effort to remove it. This “status quo bias” has 
been observed across a wide variety of contexts.83 The additional costs of 
                                                                                                                                          
 78 See id. at 259 (reporting that 44% of cities in study had waiting periods). But see Burns, 
supra note 23, at 399–400 (noting that eleven states have waiting periods). 
 79 Kleck & Patterson, supra note 35, at 282 (conceding the importance of such “leakage,” 
although not specifically with respect to waiting periods). 
 80 Ludwig & Cook, supra note 7, at 589 tbl.2. 
 81 See id. at 586. 
 82 With colleagues, the present author is currently undertaking such research. Permit require-
ments also impose delays. Several studies have found that permit requirements are associated with 
lower suicide rates. Michael D. Anestis et al., The Association Between State Laws Regulating 
Handgun Ownership and Statewide Suicide Rates, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2059, 2064 (2015), 
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2014.302465 [http://perma.cc/ZU2W-
WQEZ]; Antonio Rodríguez Andrés & Katherine Hempstead, Gun Control and Suicide: The Im-
pact of State Firearm Regulations in the United States, 1995–2004, 101 HEALTH POL’Y 95, 101 
tbl.3 (2011); Myron Boor & Jeffrey H. Bair, Suicide Rates, Handgun Control Laws, and Socio-
demographic Variables, 66 PSYCHOL. REPS. 923, 926 tbl.1 (1990). 
 83  RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 7–8 (2008). 
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notarization and mailing will add to inertia.84 Actual waiting periods, in con-
trast, impose only a delay. 
D. Would Anyone Sign Up for PAS? 
The optional nature of PAS can be both a virtue and a vice. PAS, unlike 
a mandatory waiting period, does not impose a default on everyone. PAS 
merely creates a revocable option to forgo firearm purchase. Only if people 
choose to sign up would PAS directly prevent impulsive firearm purchases 
and suicides. Recruiting participants is a two-step process. First, one must 
identify people at high risk for suicide. Second, one must convince them to 
sign up. Both steps are achievable. 
Predicting an individual suicide may be impossible, but identifying peo-
ple at high risk is not. There are warning signs in many cases that could trig-
ger identification by doctors, friends, family, and individuals themselves. In 
addition to mental illness, life crises, and alcohol use (as discussed above), 
the biggest and most obvious warning sign is a prior suicide attempt, although 
in most cases suicidal urges abate with time. A prior suicide attempt is the 
single strongest predictor of suicide. Other risk factors include hopelessness, 
a family history of suicide, childhood sexual abuse, identifying as LGBT, so-
cial isolation, and unemployment.85 People with one or more of these risk 
factors, especially a prior suicide attempt, should be more likely to 
acknowledge their risk of suicide and act to prevent it. 
But would high-risk individuals actually sign up for PAS? The evidence 
suggests that many would. PAS is just the kind of self-restriction that suicide 
prevention experts advocate and believe will be appealing. One Wyoming 
coroner who lectures on suicide prevention argues that gun owners, not the 
government, will reduce suicide rates. 86  Government-imposed restrictions 
only turn people off: “You have to use an approach that’s palatable to peo-
ple,” he said. “You’re not victimizing, you’re empowering.”87 
                                                                                                                                          
 84 See Elizabeth D. McLean, Comment, Living Will Statutes in Light of Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health: Ensuring That Patient’s Wishes Will Prevail, 40 EMORY L.J. 
1305, 1335 (1991) (“The term notary is sufficiently daunting to some, in and of itself, to discour-
age them from drafting living wills. In small towns and rural areas, the inconvenience of finding a 
notary, or of having to go to a local courthouse, provides an additional disincentive.”). But see 
NotaryCam, supra note 30 (offering webcam notarization valid in all states for twenty-five dollars 
per notarization). 
 85 WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 193–97 (Etienne G. 
Krug et al. eds., 2002). 
 86 Sabrina Tavernise, To Reduce Suicide Rates, New Focus Turns to Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/us/to-lower-suicide-rates-new-focus-turns-to-
guns.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/N6YP-U8HA]. 
 87 Id. Another frontline responder in rural Pennsylvania put it this way: “In an area where 
hunting and gun ownership are such strong traditions, you [don’t] dare say, ‘Don’t have any guns.’ 
That’s just not realistic. But how about keeping the guns locked up in a safe?” Chris Kelly, Thera-
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Many people who fear suicide already voluntarily restrict their own ac-
cess to guns. Seventy-five percent of police chiefs in a large Illinois sample 
reported having a firearm turn-in policy.88 Of those, forty-four percent report-
ed suicide-related turn-ins during one year.89 The police in Elgin, Illinois, re-
ceive “dozens” of firearms each year, even though they, like most police, of-
fer no compensation.90 
Experimental studies demonstrate that people respond to suicide risk by 
voluntarily limiting access to firearms, through police turn-ins and other 
means. In one study of emergency department visits for mental health as-
sessment or treatment of a minor, parental education persuaded five of eight 
adults with firearms to take new action to limit access, whereas none of the 
seven households that did not receive such education restricted access.91 Of 
the five who took action, three (38%) locked up firearms and two (25%) dis-
posed of them.92 In a second study involving civilly committed psychiatric 
inpatients, an intensive firearm risk management program eliminated firearm 
access for all fourteen patients who previously had access.93 Eight patients 
(57%) relinquished control of firearms to a family member or significant oth-
er, four (29%) to law enforcement officials, and two (14%) to a case manag-
er.94 
These two studies show that voluntary firearm access restrictions can be 
effective.95 Both, however, involved counseling by mental health profession-
                                                                                                                                          
pist on Front Lines of Suicide, TIMES-TRIB. (SCRANTON) (Mar. 6, 2011), http://thetimes-
tribune.com/news/therapist-on-front-lines-of-suicide-1.1114896 [http://perma.cc/24JN-DV7G]. 
 88 Michael Fendrich et al., Police Collection of Firearms to Prevent Suicide: Correlates of 
Recent Turn-In Experience, 21 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 8, 13 tbl.1 
(1998). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Elgin Police to Hold Voluntary Gun Turn-In Program Saturday, FOX 32 NEWS (CHI.) (Apr. 
2, 2013), http://www.myfoxchicago.com/story/21857460/elgin-police-to-hold-voluntary-gun-turn-in-
program-saturday-april-6 [http://perma.cc/N4VS-ZCL6]. At the same time as the 1996–97 Australian 
buyback of over 600,000 newly prohibited firearms, it was reported that “[t]ens of thousands of gun 
owners also voluntarily surrendered non-prohibited firearms without compensation.” Simon Chap-
man & Philip Alpers, Tight Gun Controls [sic] the Most Powerful Weapon, SYDNEY MORNING HER-
ALD (Apr. 27, 2006), http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/tight-gun-controls-the-most-powerful-
weapon/2006/04/26/1145861416502.html [http://perma.cc/MTW4-WL2F]. 
 91 Markus J.P. Kruesi et al., Suicide and Violence Prevention: Parent Education in the Emer-
gency Department, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 250, 252 (1999). 
 92 Id. at 253 tbl.1. 
 93 Marion E. Sherman et al., Firearms Risk Management in Psychiatric Care, 52 PSYCHIAT-
RIC SERV. 1057, 1060 tbl.3 (2001). Federal law prohibits firearm possession by people who have 
been civilly committed (although not by others in the same household). See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) 
(2012). Therefore, one can question whether the elimination of firearm access was “voluntary” for 
all subjects in this study. See id. 
 94 Sherman et al., supra note 93, at 1060 tbl.3.  
 95 See Kruesi et al., supra note 91, at 252; Sherman et al., supra note 93, at 1060; see also Nan-
cy Montgomery, Experts: Restricting Troops’ Access to Firearms Is Necessary to Reduce Rate of 
Suicides, STARS & STRIPES (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.stripes.com/news/experts-restricting-troops-
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als to restrict firearm access, which is not a built-in component of PAS. Still, 
PAS could be a useful additional means restriction measure offered by profes-
sionals in emergency departments, psychiatric wards, or elsewhere. Primary 
care providers could play an important role: one review of forty separate stud-
ies found that 45% of those who died by suicide had seen a primary care pro-
vider within the month before their death, and 77% had such contact within 
the past year.96 If primary care providers give information about PAS, many 
of those who might become suicidal will be made aware of the precommit-
ment option. In addition, a public education campaign may be able to provide 
additional awareness if personal involvement by health care professionals is 
unavailable, as it apparently does for firearm turn-in programs.97 The inter-
ventions in both studies also expressly involved friends and family.98 Partici-
pation by loved ones and their encouragement to further restrict access to 
firearms would likely be critical to the success of PAS. 
Convincing someone to sign up for PAS should be easier than convinc-
ing them to give up their gun.99 Restricting future purchases only makes sense 
for someone who has already eliminated access to existing firearms. The ini-
tial decision to go gun-free is difficult, but binding oneself to that decision 
should be easier. And the fact that the decision is revocable after a short wait-
ing period should appeal to many. One public opinion poll showed that a gen-
eral five-day waiting period for gun purchases is very popular among non-
                                                                                                                                          
access-to-firearms-is-necessary-to-reduce-rate-of-suicides-1.199216 [http://perma.cc/2UQ9-XS25] 
(citing study in which “voluntary means restriction in a group of people with an extremely high sui-
cide risk had reduced the suicide rate—to zero”). A more recent study, however, suggests that current 
efforts are failing to reduce firearm access among adolescents at high risk for suicide in the overall 
population. See Joseph A. Simonetti et al., Psychiatric Comorbidity, Suicidality, and In-Home Fire-
arm Access Among a Nationally Representative Sample of Adolescents, 72 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 152, 
157 (2015). 
 96 Jason B. Luoma et al., Contact with Mental Health and Primary Care Providers Before 
Suicide: A Review of the Evidence, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 909, 912 (2002). 
 97  MAINE DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Questions About Removing Firearms, 
http://www.maine.gov/suicide/about/lethal_questions.htm [http://perma.cc/V93X-GQH2]; CEASE-
FIRE OR. EDUC. FOUND., Year-Round Gun Turn-In, http://coef.ceasefireoregon.org/yearroundturnin 
[http://perma.cc/Y4N4-2B4Q]. 
 98 See Kruesi, supra note 91, at 251; Sherman et al., supra note 93, at 1060. 
 99 See Jennifer Harper, Two-Thirds of U.S. Weapons Owners Would ‘Defy’ a Federal Gun Ban, 
WASH. TIMES BLOG (Jan. 20, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/watercooler/2013/
jan/20/two-thirds-us-weapons-owners-would-defy-federal-gu/ [http://perma.cc/HA2U-QKBB] (not-
ing that gun owners value their firearms so highly that two-thirds claim they would keep them even if 
it violated federal law). There is good reason to think signing up for PAS would be significantly more 
appealing. Psychological research shows that out-of-pocket losses are weighed more heavily than 
foregone gains. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471, 1483–84 (1998). Giving up a gun is almost certainly encoded as a loss, whereas giving 
up purchase rights is foregoing a prospective gain and therefore less painful psychologically. 
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gun owners (with seventy-four percent approval) and is even supported by 
half of National Rifle Association (“NRA”) members.100 
It is very likely that a significant number of people would sign up for 
PAS. Of course, one cannot know in advance precisely how many would. The 
only way to know for sure is to adopt the proposal and evaluate the results.101 
This uncertainty, however, is not a significant argument against action, be-
cause PAS will be so inexpensive to implement. The NICS system is already 
up and running, so the only substantial ongoing expense will be processing 
PAS forms. To be sure, there would also be the start-up costs of producing 
and distributing forms, creating and maintaining an online interface, and edu-
cating the public, gun dealers, and mental health care providers. These costs 
are small given the real potential of PAS to save many lives.102 
III. PRINCIPLES AND PRECEDENTS 
PAS has strong theoretical support, which is bolstered by analogy to two 
successful precommitment regimes. Section A outlines the theory of pre-
commitment and shows that firearm purchase is an almost ideal context for it. 
Sections B and C highlight similarities between PAS and psychiatric advance 
directives and self-exclusion from gambling, respectively. As such, PAS is 
grounded in principle and precedent.  
A. Theory of Precommitment 
Precommitment is self-restraint projected over time. By one definition, 
“[p]recommitment, or self-binding, is a self-limiting act carried out by an 
agent for the purpose of achieving a better outcome, as assessed by his [or 
her] preferences at the time of action, than what would occur had he [or she] 
retained his [or her] full freedom of action.”103 “[D]elay devices can be effec-
                                                                                                                                          
 100 John Sides, Gun Owners vs. the NRA: What the Polling Shows, WASH. POST WONKBLOG 
(Dec. 23, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/12/23/gun-owners-vs-
the-nra-what-the-polling-shows/ [http://perma.cc/2WHV-TY3N]. 
 101 The next best thing is simply to ask people at relatively high risk for suicide. The present 
author and two colleagues are currently working on a project to do just that. 
 102 Proponents of individual liberty should support PAS even if it saves no lives. It gives indi-
viduals the freedom to exercise a new option: a binding contract with the government regarding 
firearm purchase. See Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 21 
(2009) (“Enforcement of promises arguably increases autonomy because it permits individuals to 
precommit themselves in certain contexts. Enforceable contracts add an option for promisors.”). 
On why autonomy at time 1 might trump autonomy at time 2, see infra notes 103–122 and accom-
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 103 Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Com-
plexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1783 (2003) [hereinafter Elster, Complexities 
of Precommitment]. 
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tive forms of precommitment.”104 In our case, living is preferred to dying at 
time 1, so the agent at time 1 opts out of future firearm purchases. If he or she 
does not, he or she might on an impulse at time 2 buy and use a firearm to 
commit suicide. Full freedom would have led to a worse result.105 
But why favor a preference to live at time 1 over a preference to die at 
time 2? People are free to change their minds.106 But the traditional and most 
common answer is that “precommitment is an instrument to protect us against 
passion.”107 Passion includes “visceral” feelings,108 like depression.109 Even if 
not driven by depression, the suicidal impulse is usually the product of pas-
sion, not reason.110 Reason should trump passion because reason is a truer 
expression of autonomy. Passion is one way “in which the rational self’s abil-
ity to deliberate, make decisions, and effectively exercise [one’s] will can be 
compromised.”111 One skeptic of precommitment concludes that it should be 
allowed only where the future self has a substantial defect in reason, giving as 
an example a psychiatric advance directive authorizing treatment of a bipolar 
man who, in disastrous manic states, refuses medical attention.112 
Suicidal thoughts, no less than mental health treatment refusals, are of-
ten the product of passion. Recall that most firearm suicides involve mental 
illness, life crises, relationship problems, or alcohol.113 Even a skeptic should 
concede that when passions like these overwhelm reason, precommitment is 
justified. 
This justification, however, does not apply when the precommitment it-
self is motivated by passion. Some people who volunteer for PAS will do so 
                                                                                                                                          
 104 ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 13, at 12–13, 275. 
 105 See id. at 14 (stating that mandatory firearm purchase waiting periods protect against “fits 
of murderous passion” and are not “instances of intentional precommitment”). 
 106 See Dan W. Brock, Precommitment in Bioethics: Some Theoretical Issues, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 1805, 1815 (2003). 
 107 ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 13, at 6. 
 108 Id. at 7. 
 109 See George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 285 (1996) (“[W]hile he was depressed [Wil-
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 110 See supra notes 42–55 and accompanying text. 
 111 Brock, supra note 106, at 1817. 
 112 Id. at 1805–06, 1817, 1821; accord Kristian O.R. Myrseth & Conny E. Wollbrant, A Theo-
ry of Self-Control and Naïveté: The Blights of Willpower and Blessings of Temptation, 34 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 8, 13 fig.4, 14 fig.5. (2013) (showing that where willpower is very low or where viscer-
al influence is very high, precommitment is welfare-enhancing). See generally infra note 124 and 
accompanying text (discussing psychiatric advance directives). 
 113 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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not out of cold deliberation, but out of a present fear of self-harm.114 Having 
to obtain the form, have it notarized, and mail it in would reduce the likeli-
hood of impulsive precommitment, but it is nonetheless possible. The idea 
that precommitment itself is a product of passion may be a valid criticism of 
precommitment generally,115 but not Precommitment Against Suicide. Exe-
cuting the waiver form demonstrates that at one moment in time, out of pas-
sion or reason, that person preferred life to death. Suicide eliminates the pos-
sibility that the person will ever enjoy such moments in the future.116 
To be sure, one’s moments of hopeless pain may outweigh the positive 
moments to such an extent that a rational agent may choose suicide. That may 
be a valid argument against irrevocable precommitment, but it is an argument 
in favor of the delay device proposed herein.117 A seven-day waiting period 
helps to ensure that a decision to commit firearm suicide reflects a weighing 
of costs and benefits, not an impulse. Because suicide cannot be undone, even 
impaired agents ought to be able to opt for a period of reflection.118 
To ensure deliberation, Oregon has a mandatory waiting period for phy-
sician-assisted suicide.119 A lethal prescription may be written only fifteen 
days after an oral request and forty-eight hours after a written request.120 Ore-
gon goes further, requiring counseling if the patient “may be suffering from a 
psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression.”121 The irreversibility of 
suicide justifies such mandatory safeguards, and certainly optional ones like 
PAS.122 
                                                                                                                                          
 114 See ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 13, at 19–20 (discussing the general problem 
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 115 See Brock, supra note 106, at 1821 (“Precommitment is justified when the defect is in the 
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licensed firearms dealer performing a required background check would know that an individual is 
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B. Psychiatric Advance Directives 
Suicide is strongly associated with mental illness.123 A popular precom-
mitment device for the mentally ill already exists: the psychiatric advance 
directive (“PAD”). The PAD has been defined as “a legally enforceable doc-
ument that sets forth a person’s wishes concerning psychiatric treatment in 
anticipation of the event that he or she may later become incompetent to 
make informed health care decisions.”124 The present proposal provides many 
of the same advantages as PADs and avoids several of their pitfalls. 
A primary goal of PADs is to avoid the need for coercive treatment. One 
early advocate of PADs asserted that “[a]cting and being treated as self-
determining individuals with a significant measure of authority over their 
own fate, instead of as powerless and incompetent victims of forces beyond 
their understanding and control, can be therapeutically advantageous to men-
tally ill patients.”125 That prediction has been validated through research. One 
recent study found that people with PADs were significantly less likely to 
experience coercive crisis interventions, such as forced medication and hospi-
talization.126 Giving individuals control over their own access to firearms is 
similarly empowering and may itself counter the feelings of helplessness at 
the root of many suicides. 
A major concern with PADs is the capacity of individuals with mental 
illness to execute them. Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that 
there should be a formal hearing at the time of execution.127 Others would 
require a psychiatric evaluation.128 Few dare state the rationale this openly:  
The psychiatric patient is not a self-sufficient individual directing 
[his or] her own life. [He or s]he is a person in distress, and in need 
of care. This is not only apparent when the patient is in crisis. The 
                                                                                                                                          
barred from purchase. Furthermore, the dealer would not know why the individual is barred, as 
there are many reasons for an individual to end up on the prohibited purchaser list. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g) (2012). 
 123 See NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION, supra note 55, at 11. 
 124 Elizabeth M. Gallagher, Advance Directives for Psychiatric Care: A Theoretical and Prac-
tical Overview for Legal Professionals, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 746, 746 (1998). 
 125 Bruce J. Winick, Advance Directive Instruments for Those with Mental Illness, 51 U. MI-
AMI L. REV. 57, 83 (1996). 
 126 Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Psychiatric Advance Directives and Reduction of Coercive 
Crisis Interventions, 17 J. MENTAL HEALTH 255, 259–63 (2008); see also Eric B. Elbogen et al., 
Effectively Implementing Psychiatric Advance Directives to Promote Self-Determination of 
Treatment Among People with Mental Illness, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 273, 286 (2007) 
[hereinafter Elbogen et al., Self-Determination] (“PADs may help empower people with mental 
illness [who are] among racial minorities . . . .”). 
 127 Robert D. Miller, Advance Directives for Psychiatric Treatment: A View from the Trench-
es, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 728, 738 (1998). 
 128 Id. at 745. 
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danger of future psychosis is always lingering, and induces the pa-
tient to seek help.129 
That position is incorrect, as well as deeply offensive. The law assumes 
that the mentally ill, like all people, are competent.130 To presume otherwise 
based on a psychiatric diagnosis alone is discriminatory.131 It also happens to 
be largely groundless: research suggests that “patients are generally able to 
understand, appreciate, and reason adequately with respect to PADs.”132 Of 
course, this is not to say that every patient has the capacity to complete a PAD 
without assistance or that such assistance cannot be beneficial.133 Regardless, 
requiring a psychiatric evaluation before allowing the revocable waiver of 
gun purchase rights would be incongruous. Capacity is task-specific.134 One 
might reasonably question whether a typical person with mental illness is ca-
pable of making in advance the complex, high stakes treatment decisions 
covered by PADs: confinement to a locked space, risky psychotropic medica-
tion, and electroconvulsive therapy. But there can be little doubt that the vast 
majority of people, with or without mental illness, are perfectly capable of 
deciding whether they want to give up the right to immediately purchase a 
firearm.135 
If anything, the PAD analogy may suggest that requiring notarization of 
a PAS with a witness present is too much, not too little, formality. Some ju-
risdictions require that PADs be both witnessed and notarized. 136  Yet 
“[r]esearch indicates that although approximately 70% of patients with men-
tal illness would want a PAD if offered assistance in completing one, less than 
10% have actually completed a PAD.”137 One reason patients give for not 
completing a PAD is “trouble notarizing the document while obtaining ap-
propriate witnesses.”138 Hopefully, omitting the witness requirement for the 
present proposal will encourage greater participation. Notarization, however, 
seems indispensable here given the potential for fraud inherent in a mail-in 
PAS form. 
                                                                                                                                          
 129 Guy Widdershoven & Ron Berghmans, Advance Directives in Psychiatric Care: A Narra-
tive Approach, 27 J. MED. ETHICS 92, 93 (2001). 
 130 Eric B. Elbogen et al., Competence to Complete Psychiatric Advance Directives: Effects of 
Facilitated Decision Making, 31 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 275, 288 (2007) [hereinafter Elbogen et al., 
Competence]; Winick, supra note 125, at 68 n. 39. 
 131 Elbogen et al., Self-Determination, supra note 126, at 288. 
 132 Id. at 286. 
 133 Id. at 282, 286. 
 134 See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study I: 
Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 105, 119 (1995). 
 135 The present proposal is analogous to locking the door and hiding the key, not throwing it 
away. See Winick, supra note 125, at 87. 
 136 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-72(1) (2013). 
 137 Elbogen et al., Competence, supra note 130, at 276. 
 138 Id. 
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C. Self-Exclusion from Gambling 
Under so-called “self-exclusion” programs, individuals precommit not 
to gamble, usually for a set period of time. “[T]he vast majority of jurisdic-
tions with legalized commercial casinos . . . have mandatory state-prescribed 
self-exclusion regulations.”139 Tens of thousands of people have signed up.140 
This widespread participation in a similar self-binding regime suggests that 
many people would participate in PAS. 
Self-exclusion programs work as follows. To get on the gambling self-
exclusion list in New Jersey, for example, an individual must complete a form 
and appear in person at the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement 
with photo identification.141 He or she may opt for a one-year, five-year, or 
lifetime ban.142 Even after the temporary period expires, removal from the list 
is not automatic. “A person who has chosen the one or five year exclusion 
must also make a request for removal, however it also must be accompanied 
by a letter from a mental health professional certifying that the individual is 
not suffering from a gambling problem.”143 There is no provision to revoke a 
lifetime self-exclusion.144 Casinos may refuse to accept wagers from listed 
persons and may ask the person to leave the gaming area.145 If someone slips 
through the cracks and does gamble, that person is prohibited from collecting 
winnings.146 
The primary goal of self-exclusion is obvious: to stop problem gam-
bling. Research suggests that such programs have made significant strides 
toward that goal, but have not achieved it completely. Most participants in 
Missouri’s lifetime self-exclusion program did not abstain permanently from 
gambling after enrolling, but did experience positive effects.147 Nearly 80% 
exhibited “probable pathological gambling” in the six months before enroll-
                                                                                                                                          
 139 Irina Slavina, Note, Don’t Bet on It: Casinos’ Contractual Duty to Stop Compulsive Gam-
blers from Gambling, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 369, 369–70 (2010). 
 140 IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET THINGS 
DONE 143 (2010). 
 141 Darren Gelber, The Reach of New Jersey’s Voluntary Self-Exclusion List, 281 N.J. LAW. 
32, 33 (2013); see also New Jersey Casino Gambling Self-Exclusion Program, ST. N.J. OFF. 
ATT’Y GEN. DIVISION OF GAMING ENFORCEMENT, http://www.nj.gov/oag/ge/selfexclusion.html 
[http://perma.cc/UR8F-AZN8]. 
 142 Gelber, supra note 141, at 32. One-year, five-year, and lifetime options could certainly be 
added to PAS, although the findings above suggest that most of the suicide prevention benefit can 
be achieved with much shorter periods. 
 143 Andy Rhea, Voluntary Self Exclusion Lists: How They Work and Potential Problems, 9 
GAMING L. REV. 462, 465 (2005). 
 144 Gelber, supra note 141, at 33. 
 145 Id. at 32–33. 
 146 Id. at 33. 
 147 Sarah E. Nelson et al., One Decade of Self Exclusion: Missouri Casino Self-Excluders 
Four to Ten Years After Enrollment, 26 J. GAMBLING STUD. 129, 142 (2010). 
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ment, as compared with just 15% in the six months after.148 A recent review 
reported a reduction in problem-gambling-related “psychological difficulties 
including depression and anxiety” and that enrollees “feel they have more 
control of their circumstances.”149 These findings support the view that PAS 
may similarly reduce stress and increase feelings of efficacy. 
Given the successes of gambling self-exclusion programs, some lament 
that enrollment is not greater. Because most problem gamblers do not sign 
up,150 one reviewer urges programs to remove “unnecessary complexities” 
and “legal jargon.”151 The same reviewer and others also advocate broadening 
programs to cover more gambling venues.152 Others seek improvements with-
in programs, as “[a]ccess to after-care and relapse prevention programs con-
stitute important adjuncts to self exclusion.”153 
The dual goals of providing supplemental services and maximizing en-
rollment can be in tension if those services consist of a pre-enrollment evalua-
tion: 
A significant proportion of individuals initiating self-exclusion of-
ten do so spontaneously in a state of emotional distress in response 
to heavy losses sustained during a gambling session. Such deci-
sions may be considered ‘spur of the moment’ reactions that are 
subsequently regretted in the ‘cooling off’ period. . . . Thus there is 
an imperative need for competent and comprehensive clinical as-
sessment complementing the formal administrative/legal require-
ments to be conducted at the point of initiating self-exclusion.154 
One might seize upon this prescription to argue for clinical assessment 
before individuals are allowed to sign up for PAS, because there is more than 
superficial similarity between gambling impulses and suicidal impulses. 
Problem gambling is an addiction and a type of mental illness, and the emo-
tional distress from a large gambling loss could certainly qualify as a pas-
                                                                                                                                          
 148 Id. at 137 tbl.2. 
 149 Sally M. Gainsbury, Review of Self-Exclusion from Gambling Venues as an Intervention 
for Problem Gambling, 30 J. GAMBLING STUD. 229, 246 (2014). 
 150 See id.  
 151 Id. at 247. 
 152 AYRES, supra note 140, at 144; Gainsbury, supra note 149, at 247. 
 153 Nelson et al., supra note 147, at 143. See also Nicole Tremblay et al., Improved Self-
Exclusion Program: Preliminary Results, 24 J. GAMBLING STUD. 505, 509–15 (2008) (reporting 
results of a self-exclusion program that included a mandatory meeting); Alex Blaszczynski et al., 
Self-Exclusion: A Proposed Gateway to Treatment Model, 7 INT’L GAMBLING STUD. 59, 67 
(2007) (proposing more integrated treatment options). 
 154 Blaszczynski et al., supra note 153, at 64–65; see also Tremblay et al., supra note 153, at 
516 (“During registration, most people are in emotional turmoil and just want to complete the 
process as quickly as possible.” (citation omitted)). 
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sion. 155  As with suicidal thoughts, the compulsion to gamble ebbs and 
flows.156 
But despite these similarities, even if one supports requiring an assess-
ment before self-exclusion from gambling, no such assessment should be re-
quired for PAS. The key differences, as suggested above, are the permanence 
of suicide, the short period of delay to purchase a firearm, and the relatively 
easy revocability of the firearm purchase waiver. If an individual regrets a 
spur-of-the-moment decision to waive their gun purchase rights, they can 
simply reverse it with a notarized form and a week-long wait. 
The gambling and suicide analogy is imperfect,157 but nonetheless gen-
erally supports PAS. Perhaps most significantly, although many problem 
gamblers have not signed up for self-exclusion, thousands have, voluntarily 
self-binding against self-destructive behavior. The effect of self-exclusion 
programs on gambling behavior obviously depends upon enforcement, but 
the positive psychological effects of self-exclusion suggest comparable ad-
vantages for PAS in terms of reducing anxiety and depression and increasing 
feelings of control. With PAS, one simple form will prevent gun purchases in 
all fifty states, a significant improvement over casino-specific or state-
specific self-exclusion programs. 
The self-exclusion from gambling analogy also supports using the PAS 
gun program to target other suicide prevention services. New Jersey’s re-
quirement for assessment by a mental health professional in order to be re-
moved from the self-exclusion list suggests that modifying the PAS proposal 
to include a similar requirement for removal from the no-guns list could save 
additional lives. Given the life-and-death stakes associated with reinstatement 
of gun purchase rights, reinstatement could even require judicial approval. 
Such a requirement could be an option available on the sign-up form. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Constitutionality arguments against PAS may be raised, but none with-
stand careful analysis, as demonstrated below. Section A first considers wheth-
er PAS constitutes state action. Section B addresses the Second Amendment 
and illustrates how PAS would satisfy both intermediate and strict scrutiny. 
Section C rejects right-to-die challenges. Finally, section D argues that to the 
extent PAS theoretically violates constitutional rights, requiring notarization 
should constitute a valid waiver of those rights. 
                                                                                                                                          
 155  Justin E. Bauer, Comment, Self-Exclusion and the Compulsive Gambler: The House 
Shouldn’t Always Win, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 63, 76–77 (2006). 
 156 See Gainsbury, supra note 149, at 230. 
 157 There is no constitutional right to gamble, but there may arguably be a right to die in some 
states. See infra notes 195–201 and accompanying text. 
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A. State Action 
A threshold question in determining the constitutionality of PAS is 
whether PAS involves state action. PAS is analogous to locking one’s fire-
arms in a safe, which on its face does not implicate the Constitution. But this 
analogy is incomplete: a closer analogy would be locking one’s firearms in a 
safe, then entrusting the key to the government. This makes the government a 
joint participant or venturer in the private activity.158 Indeed, the government 
merely setting up the statutory scheme that enables self-restrictions on gun 
purchases may be sufficient to clear this state action hurdle.159 Accordingly, 
the remainder of this Part assumes that PAS constitutes state action.160  
Even if there is state action, it is action to enhance private decision-
making. And the decision being made with PAS is to confidentially give up 
one’s gun purchase rights in order to prevent one’s own suicide. At the most 
basic level, the Constitution protects “the right to be let alone.”161 Surely, a 
personal choice to forgo the deadliest method of committing suicide is in-
cluded in this right and, more specifically, in one’s rights to life, liberty, and 
privacy. The Constitution should protect, not prohibit, this choice.  
B. The Right to Bear Arms 
PAS does not violate the Second Amendment because it functions much 
like an optional waiting period, and even mandatory waiting periods do not 
necessarily violate the Second Amendment.162 Impeding access to firearms 
                                                                                                                                          
 158 Gregory D. Malaska, Note, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sulli-
van: “Meta-Analysis” as a Tool to Navigate Through the Supreme Court’s “State Action” Maze, 
17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 619, 652–53 (2001). But see Price v. Int’l Union, 795 F.2d 
1128 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[W]hen a private party makes the ultimate choice within a range of options 
offered by the government, state action generally is not implicated.”); Jack Gravelle, Note, Hold 
the Phone: Making the Call for “Personal Exceptions” to the Do-Not-Call Registry, 65 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 991, 1019 (2004) (arguing that a government do-not-call-registry that allows for personal 
exceptions does not constitute state action because the government is merely “enforcing the deci-
sions made by the individual”). 
 159 See Malaska, supra note 158 at 653; see also Hargrave v. Vermont, 340 F.3d 27, 38 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (holding that a state statute authorizing durable powers of attorney for health care deci-
sions was a program or activity provided by a public entity). 
 160 This article also assumes that the underlying NICS system is functional and constitutional. 
Recent court decisions support that assumption. See Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 
2264–66 (2014) (affirming that the actual buyer of a firearm must pass a federal background 
check); Colo. Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1075–76 (D. Colo. 2014) 
(holding that the state’s expansion of mandatory background checks to some private transfers did 
not violate the Second Amendment). 
 161 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 162 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 777–78 (2010) (affirming that the Sec-
ond Amendment gives individuals the right to bear arms, which is incorporated against states and 
municipalities as well); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.570, 575 (2008) (stating that the 
individual’s right to bear arms is not unlimited). 
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arguably burdens conduct and implicates the Second Amendment.163 This 
does not end the inquiry, however; courts have held that such a burden does 
not violate the Second Amendment if it meets intermediate scrutiny—i.e., if it 
is substantially related to an important government interest.164  
Mandatory waiting periods to buy firearms withstand intermediate scru-
tiny. First of all, preventing suicide is plainly important.165 Further, the re-
search cited above establishes that a waiting period is substantially related to 
the goal of preventing suicide: the best study to date found that a five-day 
waiting period significantly reduced firearm suicide for older people.166 To be 
sure, more research is needed.167 But the legislature need not wait for scien-
tific consensus to act in order for its actions to pass intermediate scrutiny.168 
What researchers and legislatures do know about suicide further sup-
ports the theory that a waiting period to buy guns will likely reduce sui-
cides.169 As described above, suicide is very often impulsive and tied to men-
tal illness, life crises, relationship problems, and alcohol. Guns are particular-
ly lethal as compared with other methods of suicide, and a significant portion 
of suicides involve recently purchased guns. In light of these findings, it 
                                                                                                                                          
 163 See Silvester v. Harris, No. 1:11-CV-2137, 2013 WL 6415670, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 
2013) (concluding that the California law imposing a ten-day cooling off period on gun purchases 
burdens Second Amendment rights). 
 164 See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136–38 (describing a two-step framework 
for analyzing laws that restrict firearm access: “(1) ask[] whether the challenged law burdens con-
duct protected by the Second Amendment and (2) if so . . . apply an appropriate level of scruti-
ny”). Intermediate scrutiny is the standard most often used. See id. at 1138, 1138 n. 5 (noting that 
Second Amendment challenges are subject to either intermediate or strict scrutiny, and that most 
courts have applied intermediate scrutiny); Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: 
What’s a Court to Do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 513 (2012) (report-
ing that intermediate scrutiny is most frequently used); see also Stephen Kiehl, Comment, In 
Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1155–
63 (2011) (arguing that intermediate scrutiny should be the most frequently used standard). 
 165 Fredrick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a Right to Bear 
Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 23 (2013). 
 166 See Ludwig & Cook, supra note 7, 588. The only other domestic study found no signifi-
cant effect, but was methodologically flawed. See supra notes 75–82 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing American studies). 
 167 See Robert A. Hahn et al., Firearms Laws and the Reduction of Violence: A Systematic 
Review, 28 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 40, 52 (2005) (calling for more research on the efficacy 
of waiting periods).  
 168 See Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 99 (2d Cir. 2012) (“It is the legisla-
ture’s job, not ours, to weigh conflicting evidence and make policy judgments.”); see also Gonza-
les v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (“The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide 
discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”); J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 300 
(2009) (arguing that courts lack capacity “to sift through complicated data”). But see Silvester, 
2013 WL 6415670, at *6 (finding that the government did not meet its burden to justify the ten-
day waiting period where it offered “no evidence” that the period would advance the stated goal of 
reducing gun violence). 
 169 See supra notes 62–71 and accompanying text. 
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would be very surprising if waiting periods did not reduce the number of sui-
cides. 
One commentator has argued that any waiting period longer than twen-
ty-four hours would violate the Second Amendment.170 The rationale was that 
the research on the effectiveness of waiting periods on murder and suicide 
was inconclusive, and that twenty-four hours was roughly where courts drew 
the line for constitutional abortion waiting periods.171 But the suicide-specific 
research summarized above, particularly when combined with foreign stud-
ies, suggests that waiting periods probably do reduce suicide.172 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court decision upholding the 
twenty-four-hour waiting period for abortion did not apply intermediate scru-
tiny and did not suggest that there was anything magical about the number.173 
To the contrary, it held that the waiting period was not an “undue burden” on 
the right to abortion even though “the practical effect [for women at some 
distance to an abortion provider] will often be a delay of much more than a 
day.”174 This suggests that a formal delay of seven days in the context of PAS 
would not be an undue burden on the Second Amendment right.175 
To be sure, one federal district court has held that a ten-day waiting pe-
riod did not pass intermediate scrutiny.176 But this holding was expressly lim-
ited to would-be gun purchasers who already owned other guns.177 The court 
explained: “A waiting period for a newly purchased firearm will not deter an 
individual from committing impulsive acts of violence with a separate firearm 
that is already in his or her possession.”178 Only individuals without access to 
a firearm are likely to volunteer for PAS. And should such individuals later 
acquire a gun (through means other than a federally licensed dealer), they 
need only submit a notarized form and wait a week before future gun pur-
chases from licensed dealers will be unimpeded. 
                                                                                                                                          
 170 Burns, supra note 23, at 408. 
 171 Id. at 407–08, 410. But see Wilkinson, supra note 168, at 300 (predicting that after the 
Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Heller, “courts may be able to find an unreasonable limitation 
on gun ownership ‘simply by selectively string-citing the right social science articles’” (quoting 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 991 n.6 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment and dissenting in part))). 
 172 See supra notes 62–71 and accompanying text. 
 173 Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 885–86. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Eugene Volokh has leveled another criticism against waiting periods that applies only to 
handguns: “It’s as easy to commit suicide with a shotgun as with a handgun . . . .” Eugene Volokh, 
Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a 
Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1538 (2009). That criticism does not entirely apply to 
the present proposal, which covers all firearms. 
 176 Silvester, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 964–68. 
 177 Id. at 934. 
 178 Id. at 966. 
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Some courts have applied strict rather than intermediate scrutiny to sub-
stantial burdens on Second Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit for the U.S. 
Court of Appeals stated that “severe restrictions on the ‘core’ right have been 
thought to trigger a kind of strict scrutiny.”179 One can question whether that 
view accords with the United States Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller.180 But even assuming that it does, a seven-day 
waiting period is not a substantial or severe enough burden to justify strict 
scrutiny. On remand in Heller, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit held that a thirty-day waiting period to register a second 
pistol imposed only a “modest burden[]” on Second Amendment rights and 
would therefore be judged under intermediate scrutiny.181 Likewise, in 2011, 
in United States v. Laurent, Judge Weinstein of the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York held that a temporary restriction on the ship-
ping, transportation, and receipt—but not possession—of firearms merited 
intermediate, not strict, scrutiny.182 
If strict scrutiny does apply to PAS, it will require the government to 
show that its policy is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est.”183 Undoubtedly, preventing suicide is compelling.184 Whether the re-
search above establishes that a mandatory waiting period is narrowly tailored 
to serve that goal is a closer question.185 What is not a close question is that a 
firearm purchase waiting period limited to those who opt in based on their 
own perceived risk of suicide is narrowly tailored to prevent suicide. The fit 
is every bit as tight as optional do-not-call lists are in protecting privacy, 
which courts have found to be narrowly tailored when such lists have been 
                                                                                                                                          
 179 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 180 In District of Columbia v. Heller, Justice Breyer stated:  
[T]he majority implicitly, and appropriately, rejects [strict scrutiny] by broadly ap-
proving a set of laws—prohibitions on concealed weapons, forfeiture by criminals 
of the Second Amendment right, prohibitions on fire arms in certain locales, and 
governmental regulation of commercial fire arm sales—whose constitutionality un-
der a strict scrutiny standard would be far from clear. 
554 U.S. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 181 Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1248, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 182 861 F. Supp. 2d 71, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (applying intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral time, place, and manner 
restrictions on speech). 
 183 United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 55 U.S. 449, 465 (2007)). 
 184 Vars & Young, supra note 165, at 23. 
 185 Compare Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 947–49 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
a juvenile curfew was not narrowly tailored to the compelling interest of reducing juvenile crime 
and victimization, notwithstanding protestation that the court would “not dismiss the City’s legis-
lative conclusion that the curfew [would] have a salutary effect”), with Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 
488, 493 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating, in the course of upholding juvenile curfew, that even under 
strict scrutiny courts “do not demand of legislatures scientifically certain criteria of legislation”). 
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challenged under the First Amendment.186 Self-reported suicide risk assess-
ment tools have been shown to be reliable and valid.187 One leading tool asks 
directly “[h]ow likely is it that you will attempt suicide someday?” and as-
signs more points to that question than to any other.188 Courts may not owe 
legislatures much deference under strict scrutiny, but courts should defer to an 
individual’s assessment of their own suicide risk.189 
An alternative argument builds on Joseph Blocher’s assertion that “the 
Second Amendment’s guarantee of an individual right to keep or bear arms in 
self-defense should include the freedom not to keep or bear them at all.”190 
PAS can be viewed as a tool to strengthen this right not to bear arms—by 
binding oneself against too hastily bearing arms in the future. The animating 
principle of the Second Amendment right is self-defense.191 One such threat 
to personal safety is firearm suicide.192 Blocher writes: 
[I]t seems odd that self-defense decisions should only be constitu-
tionally protected when they are effectuated with a gun, rather than 
threatened by one. In either case, the goal of the person making the 
decision is to limit a risk of future harm. Indeed, even the affirma-
tive Second Amendment right does not directly involve acts of self-
                                                                                                                                          
 186 See Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 358 F.3d 1228, 1242 (10th Cir. 
2004) (holding that the national do-not-call registry is narrowly tailored because “it restricts only 
calls that are targeted at unwilling recipients”); Nat’l Coalition of Prayer, Inc. v. Carter, No. 02-
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defense, but rather the freedom to have certain means available to 
protect oneself against certain kinds of harm.193 
PAS gives individuals another means to protect themselves from future harm 
and is therefore wholly consonant with the motivating spirit of the Second 
Amendment.194 
C. The Right to Die? 
There is no constitutional right to commit suicide. Although there is a 
right to refuse life-saving medical treatment,195 the Federal Constitution, for 
better or worse, does not protect a general right to die. In 1997, in Washington 
v. Glucksberg, the United States Supreme Court held that there was no consti-
tutional right to assisted suicide.196 The holding was narrow, but a majority of 
the justices declined to protect a right to unassisted suicide either.197 This con-
firmed an earlier Michigan Supreme Court holding that “the Due Process 
Clause of the [F]ederal [C]onstitution does not encompass a fundamental 
right to commit suicide, with or without assistance.”198 
Even if there were a constitutional right to commit suicide in some cir-
cumstances, PAS would not violate it.199 A state trial court recently held that 
the New Mexico Constitution recognizes a patient’s choice of assistance in 
dying as a fundamental right, protected by strict scrutiny.200 The burden of 
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(2012) (arguing for unconditional right to commit suicide). 
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PAS on the right to die is slight: it restricts access to just one lethal means and 
allows for revocation of the restriction with just a one-week delay. Only those 
with merely fleeting suicidal intent will be prevented from taking their own 
lives. PAS is narrowly tailored to the compelling interest of preventing impul-
sive suicide.201 
D. Waiver of Rights 
The right to bear arms and any right to die are both waivable; thus, PAS 
does not violate either. PAS requires execution and notarization of a brief 
form explaining that the individual is making a revocable waiver of their right 
to purchase a firearm. This is substantially greater formality than is typically 
required for a waiver of Second Amendment rights. One waives the right to 
bear arms simply by walking into certain restaurants.202 One can waive the 
right to bear arms even in one’s home by signing a lease, with notice.203 And 
though the result has been criticized, one can even waive the right to bear 
arms retroactively by having pled guilty to a disqualifying offense.204 
The following principles generally govern waiver. “A waiver is ordinari-
ly an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege.”205 The validity of a waiver depends on “the particular facts and circum-
stances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and 
conduct of the [rights-holder].”206 Waivers of constitutional rights “not only 
must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient 
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”207 The 
presumption is against waiver.208 
Notarization of a signed form is strong evidence of a valid waiver, 
though not a guarantee.209 Notaries attest to the identity of the signatory, not 
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to the signatory’s level of understanding.210 It is therefore possible that some-
one could opt into a firearm waiting period without knowledge or intelli-
gence. This is very unlikely under the circumstances proposed here. The form 
will explain clearly that the signer is giving up the right to purchase firearms. 
Further, the form will explain the simple process to restore that right. Unlike 
with the right to silence or right to counsel, the consequences of waiver here 
are obvious, narrow, and revocable with a slight delay as the only penalty.211 
More fundamentally, in its 1986 opinion in Colorado v. Connelly, the 
United States Supreme Court made clear that lack of understanding not pro-
duced by state action does not undermine the validity of waiver.212 In Connel-
ly, the defendant Connelly approached a police officer and immediately con-
fessed to murder.213 The officer advised him of his right to remain silent and 
right to an attorney.214 To the officer’s bewilderment, Connelly continued his 
confession, stating that he had not been drinking but had been a patient in 
several mental hospitals.215 Expert testimony accepted by the Colorado Su-
preme Court established that Connelly was schizophrenic, hearing voices, and 
“clearly” unable to make an “intelligent” decision.216 The United States Su-
preme Court reversed the lower courts’ exclusion of Connelly’s confession, 
holding that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding 
that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”217 Similarly, because the state is not 
involved in executing and notarizing the PAS form, the waiver is valid.218 
One might observe that at least Connelly received an oral warning. But 
the oral warning had no effect: “Connelly’s illness destroyed his volition and 
compelled him to confess.”219 Although a verbal explanation of the form 
could be valuable or helpful for people who are not actively psychotic, it is 
not required; even the right to counsel during a custodial interrogation, where 
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police coercion is always a concern, may be waived by a written document 
with no verbal admonition.220 
Another waiver analogy supports PAS: a deathbed gift of all real and 
personal property, which effectively waives the constitutional right of descent 
and devise.221 A gift of personal property can be oral, but a gift of real proper-
ty must comply with the applicable statute of frauds.222 Most jurisdictions 
require only a signed writing,223 though use of a notary is common in New 
York at least.224 PAS adopts this high level of formality which, if adequate to 
give away all of one’s property, should be adequate to delay purchase of one 
very specific item of personal property—viz., firearms. 
A perhaps closer analogy is the psychiatric advance directive, or PAD, 
discussed above. One commentator has argued that because psychiatric ad-
vance directives can waive the fundamental right to refuse treatment, execu-
tion must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.225 The commentator con-
tended that two witnesses could adequately ensure voluntariness, but clearer 
waiver language and an independent “rights advocate” are needed for in-
formed consent. 226 Clear waiver language would be included in the PAS 
form, but a “rights advocate” is not needed here because the decision is 
straightforward and revocable.227 As with the execution of a will, notarization 
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is an adequate substitute for two witnesses and, in fact, better in a very im-
portant way.228 A mail-in form has greater forgery potential than a will or ad-
vance directive, and a notary’s seal is harder to fake than a few witness signa-
tures.229 
A notarized form should constitute valid waiver in the PAS circum-
stance, but there may be room for confused or coerced individuals to subse-
quently object to the precommitment. Such exceptional cases, however, do 
not undermine the constitutionality of the proposal. The process does not 
have to be flawless; rather, it need only sort individuals well enough so that 
the proposal, as a whole, is substantially related (or perhaps narrowly tai-
lored) to the compelling goal of preventing suicide.230 Allowing those who 
fear impulsive firearm suicide to opt for a firearm purchase waiting period 
plainly meets that test.231 Thus, PAS does not violate the Constitution. 
V. TWO COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO PAS 
PAS can be criticized by both liberals and conservatives, but these criti-
cisms are not persuasive. Opponents on the left might argue that PAS is not 
restrictive enough; indeed, a significant limitation of PAS is that it will not 
prevent purchases from sellers who are not licensed dealers.232 Federal law 
does not require a background check for these so-called private sales, which 
have been estimated to constitute as many as forty percent of firearm trans-
fers.233 Because PAS piggybacks onto NICS, it would not impede private 
firearm transactions. Closing this so-called “gun show” or “private sale” 
loophole federally would be the best solution, but this appears unlikely given 
the current political climate (despite strong popular support).234 
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There is another response (although not entirely satisfying) to the criti-
cism that PAS will not suffice given the private sale loophole: private sales 
tend to have a built-in time delay. Internet purchases and old-fashioned classi-
fied ads require some period of time for delivery or pickup. Furthermore, gun 
shows are ephemeral. Only if there happens to be one nearby at the moment 
an individual decides to commit suicide will he or she be able to quickly buy 
a gun through that avenue. Therefore, the licensed dealer with regular busi-
ness hours and a known and fixed location will remain the preferred purchase 
venue for suicidal individuals. PAS may not prevent every sale, but it will 
prevent many. 
On the opposite side of the political spectrum, some opponents on the 
right will argue that seven days is too long to wait for a gun should an unan-
ticipated need for self-defense arise.235 In such a case, “[t]he suicide preven-
tion device may turn into a suicide pact.”236 However, such circumstances are 
probably very rare, and not unique; there is likewise no time to run to a gun 
store during a robbery or assault. And if the threat warranting the purchase of 
a gun for self-defense is less immediate—e.g., when moving to a new neigh-
borhood or working the night shift—waiting a week for a gun is no great bur-
den. 
More fundamentally, the likelihood of needing a gun for self-defense not 
instantly but in less than a week must be balanced against the risk of impul-
sive suicide by firearm. PAS allows individuals to decide for themselves how 
to strike that balance. It is roughly the same calculus people undertake when 
deciding whether to keep a gun in their home. No one should be forced to 
own a gun,237 so no one should be prevented from making it slightly harder 
for him or herself to purchase one.  
CONCLUSION 
People ought to be allowed to make it more difficult to take their own 
lives. The specific proposal here—voluntarily preventing one’s own firearm 
purchases for a period of at least a week—has the potential to save many 
lives. Between six hundred and two thousand people each year commit sui-
cide with a recently obtained firearm. And restricting access to firearms has 
been demonstrated to reduce suicide. 
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Allowing individuals to add their own names to the list of prohibited 
firearm purchasers is strongly supported by precommitment theory and prac-
tice. Self-binding against passionate, impulsive suicide is the ideal situation 
for precommitment. This conclusion is bolstered by analogies to two existing 
precommitment regimes: psychiatric advance directives and self-exclusion 
from gambling programs. These programs have proven successful; PAS has 
the potential to be an even greater success. 
Importantly, PAS would not run afoul of the Constitution. People who 
believe that they are at high risk for suicide would have the option to restrict 
their own access to guns. This is narrowly tailored to the compelling govern-
ment interest in preventing suicide.238  
Finally, it should be emphasized again that PAS has the potential to save 
lives at a very low cost. After initial start-up expenses, the most significant 
ongoing expense will be processing PAS forms. These costs are small in 
comparison to the cost of suicide—just ask Jonathan Jacoves’s parents.239 If 
PAS saves even one life, as seems very likely, it will have been a good in-
vestment.
                                                                                                                                          
 238 It should be noted that a genuine constitutional challenge to PAS by a volunteer would be 
unlikely. Sending in a notarized removal form would provide complete redress in a much faster 
and less expensive way than a lawsuit. 
 239 See Kelly, supra note 87 (“It is the worst thing in the world to lose a child,” said one trau-
ma specialist. “It is even worse when it is by his or her own hand.”). 
  
 
 
